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“The Frontier is where the Jews Live”: 




The frontier is where Jews live, not where there is a line on the map. Golda Meir 
 
 
 Space and law, or rather the space of law and law applied to space were among the 
primary elements of Israeli colonial sovereignty in the Occupied Palestinian Territories 
(OPT) and of the forms of subjugation it employs to express this force. Through colonial 
practices that have systematically violated the borders of the very same international 
legislation that enabled ‘temporary’ Israeli occupation, and through the legal 
regularization of these violations, the landscape of the OPT has been gradually 
transformed into a legal arena in which colonial sovereignty works by means of a mixed 
system involving the application –and mutual integration– of increasingly complex laws 
and constant ‘innovations’ in government instruments and practices affecting Palestinian 
movements and areas. This historical process has become even more evident after the 
Oslo Accords, when the institutionalization of the separation between Israelis and 
Palestinians –without decolonization33– resulted in increased Israeli 
compartmentalization of the Palestinian landscape and the refinement of its techniques in 
doing so. 
 
 Like other colonized peoples, the Palestinians do not live so much in a real system 
of “suspended sovereignty” (Kimmerling 1982: 200) as in a situation where Israeli 
colonial sovereignty is continuously undergoing refinement, in a spatial and peripheral 
frontier in which the colonial encounter (Evans 2009) is the moment of the creation, 
application and re-activation of the colonial order.  In such a context, what is interesting 
is not so much the question of the legality or illegality of the practices and rules that reify 
the occupation so much as that of their logic and of how they came into being through 
space. Space is in fact some of the main issues in colonial hierarchization and separation; 
it is not mere means, but materialization of policies. 
In his analysis on how, in the West Bank, the distribution of legal rights among “Israeli 
citizens” and “Palestinian subjects” takes place – in the daily practices – along what he 
names “ethno-national lines”, reproducing those very inequalities on which this 
differential legal order is founded, Thobias Kelly (2006: 172) sheds light on how colonial 
– spatial – compartmentalization and legal statuses are deeply intermingled: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 The studies on which this article is based were made possible by a grant generously awarded by the 
Fondazione Angelo Frammartino. The 5 maps and figures contained within the article have been created by 
Architect Samir Harb (Battir Landscape Office). 
32 Author is PhD in Political Anthropology, Siena University; Research Fellow, UNESCO, Ramallah and at 
Muwatin, Palestinian Institute for the Study of Democracy. 
33 On the institutionalization of the separation produced by the Oslo Accords and its paradoxes, Neve Gordon 
writes: “One cannot fully understand the replacement of the colonization with the separation principle without 
examining Palestinian space. Historically, the withdrawal of colonial powers from their colonies has entailed 
the abdication of control over the means of legitimate movement within and from the colonies. […] By contrast, 
[after Oslo] in both the Gaza Strip and the West Bank Israel has maintained its control over movement […], in 
reality it continues to control both the space that the Palestinians occupy and the legitimate means of 
movement” (Gordon 2008: 208). 
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 Legal status [in the West Bank] is always a spatial practice, since the checking of 
documents takes place in particular locations. The Israeli state constantly moves between 
being a state of its citizens wherever they may be and a territorially bounded state. It has 
no legal boundaries, but instead delimits its reach through armistice lines, walls and 
checkpoints that are constantly shifting, by sometimes following bodies and sometimes 
taking shape within specific places and spaces. 
 
 Fundamentally, the territory of the West Bank has progressively been transformed 
into a proliferation of frontiers, in a space in which legal boundaries, “following bodies” 
or moving to specific places and spaces, have constantly shifted, shaping the constant and 
unlimited process of formation of the Israeli state. As Eyal Weizman (2006: 91) has 
pointed out, in such a context, state and non-state actors share the principles and the 
strategic objectives of an “organized chaos”: 
 
 Criticized for their brutality, colonial powers have often claimed they lacked 
effective means to enforce their own laws on the periphery of their territories, or claim 
that the criminal actions carried out by their agents are exceptions that do not reflect the 
rule. Often, however, these powers profit in psychological effect and/or territorial control 
from the brutal and illegal “local initiatives” of armed settlers or rough soldiers, without 
having to take responsibility for the latter’s actions. Colonizing states may excuse what is 
effectively the rule as an exception, and exceptions as the rule. […] When the frontier 
seems to degenerate in complete lawlessness, it is because its “organized chaos” is often 
generated from the center. 
 
 My article will focus on a specific area of this system of producing spatial and 
legal lines –Battir, West of Bethlehem, and the Gush Etzion colonial block. I will firstly 
attempt to reconstruct the main stages in the genesis of Israel’s sovereignty over the area, 
the facts relevant to the process –still underway, still internationally unrecognized, but no 
less real for this– of creating spaces and rules of separation and annexation that have, bit 
by bit, resulted in an extension of the spaces of Israeli citizenship and a reduction of the 
spaces of Palestinian non-citizenship and subjugation. In the second part of the article I 
will present the case of one of the multifarious “operators” and “operations” (Foucault 
2003) which has recently taken shape within the framework of the Israeli apparatus of 
control over Palestinian space. My aim is that of “de-centralising” the analysis of state 
colonial law and re-contextualizing it in the framework of action of one of the many 
examples of “operators” who embody the very essence of the Israeli colonial regime: 
settlers. This paper argues, through the analysis of the genesis of a legal case study in the 
Israeli Supreme Court, that new political assemblages such as human rights (“ethnically 
pure”) settler organisations can act as repressive actors and make Israeli sovereignty and 
spatial forms of control more and more sophisticated in such a contemporary colonial 
frontier as Palestine. This case can highlight the historical excesses of Israeli colonial 
sovereignty –the extension of colonial sovereignty “where the Jews live”– and the modus 
operandi of these new expressions of power, whose final aim is that of perpetuating the 
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The Enclavisation of a Palestinian Area 
 Before analysing our case study of democratic colonialism, it is necessary to 
provide a synthetic reconstruction and contextualisation of how the Palestinian space in 
which our legal case saw the light has been historically enclavised. Prior to 1948, Battir 
and its surrounding villages looked to Jerusalem –culturally, economically and from the 
point of view of spatial practices. The inhabitants of the area, particularly known for its 
cultivation of vegetables, used to sell their produce at the town markets. Battir, Nahalin, 
Wadi Fukin and Al Walajeh are in fact characterized by a widespread system of irrigated 
terraces where vegetables are cultivated. The system of irrigated terraces played an 
important role not only in the economic life of the area but also in determining the 
mobility of its inhabitants, who travelled daily to the markets in the District of Jerusalem.  
It is important to draw attention to the genealogy of the connections and disconnections 
that have distinguished the history of our area of study. During the Ottoman period, Battir 
was connected to Jerusalem by an abundant series of valleys. A path which could be 
walked led the people from the village through these valleys directly to the Old City of 
Jerusalem. Until 1890 this was the main route to the Holy City. In 1890, the Ottoman 
administration built a railway line not far from the path. This railway would connect the 
villages to Jerusalem and Jaffa. After the construction of the railway and its connection to 
the main centres of the Arab world –Cairo, Damascus, Beirut, Mecca– the train became 
an opportunity for travel, and for new experiences –mostly for study and commerce– in 
the major Arab sites of culture. 
 
 Immediately after 1948, with the creation of the state of Israel, a patent process of 
fragmentation began to afflict the area of Battir and the surrounding villages situated 
south-east of Jerusalem: a process in which war, negotiations and official agreements 
between Israelis and the Jordanian administration, and planning of a differential use of 
the infrastructures of transport along ethno-national lines altered the shape of the area’s 
territory. 
 
 After the Rhodes Agreement of 1949 between King Abdullah of Jordan and the 
first Israeli government, the Ottoman railway was renovated by the Israeli state, which 
subsequently decided to close the station of Battir and effectively eliminate the village’s 
railway stop, preventing the local inhabitants from using the train. This policy of closure 
marked the start of a process of fragmentation, separation and restrictions that has 
increased steadily over the decades (see Fig. 1). 
 
 Non-reification of the Green Line34 into a boundary that separates Israelis and 
Palestinians, the Israeli army’s campaign to occupy the West Bank and the building of 
civil colonial structures and infrastructures (the settlements) subsequent to 1967, are all 
factors that have further altered the geography, landscape and territorial-jurisdictional 
order of the area under analysis. The villages of Battir, Al Walajeh, Nahalin, Husan, 
Wadi Fukin and Jaba’a were the focus of the first intense Israeli colonization campaign 
since the Six Day War. The aim was to create a large colonial block south of Jerusalem: 
what is currently Gush Etzion. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 The Green Line has over the years become increasingly less permeable in the relations between Palestinians 
and Israelis. It has never become a real border and, as a result, it is subject to change, to political calculations, 
dreams of “territorial exchanges” in the so-called peace negotiations and to constant administrative and 
territorial amendment.  
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In 1967, encouraged by the radical messianism of certain rabbinic schools, the 
‘redemption’ of Gush Etzion began, with the creation of the Kfar Etzion colony, blending 
socialist and messianic aspirations with those of a colonial sovereignty yet to be 
established, as can be inferred by the words of one of the rabbis from the orthodox 
cooperative that backed the operation: “the  commandment […] that states that the Land 
of Israel must be in the hands of the Jewish people 
 
[does not only mean] that settlements must be created, but that [the Land of Israel] is 
under Jewish sovereignty [Italics are by the author]” (Gorenberg 2007: 107). After a long 
debate between various governmental and non-governmental figures, aspiring settlers, 
members of the  National Religious Party of the Knesset, rabbinic schools and members 
of the Greater Israel Movement, at the end of 1967, even the Israeli Prime Minister Levi 
Eshkol accepted the idea of starting a campaign to colonize the West Bank. “Masking” 
      77 
the colony as a “military outpost”35, which would somehow have been tolerated by 
international law, the settlers and the government welded on the common strategic 
objective of expanding Israel’s territorial sovereignty. Essentially, a varied group of 
figures not belonging to state organizations pushed a compliant government beyond the 
limits set by international law, in a complex legal and colonial scheme that crossed the 
Green Line for the first time and marked the start of one of the most considerable and 
historically stratified settlers’ blocks in the West bank, later administratively formalized 
into a “Regional Council”. A mixture between “Utopian imagination and planned topian 
praxis” (Efrat 2003: 61), therefore, contributed to the genesis of Gush Etzion, or the 
Etzion Block. 
 
 Over the following decades, well-organized architectural and legal procedures and 
brutal military orders resulted in the gradual expropriation of the Palestinian villages west 
of Bethlehem. In a dramatic escalation, the construction of these colonies36 and 
infrastructures has, in many cases, irreversibly changed the landscape of the area. Battir 
and its surrounding villages witnessed the proliferation of legal and military mechanisms 
of dispossession and further enclavisation. Several thousands of dunams of land were 
confiscated and expropriated in the Seventies and the early Eighties by the Israeli 
administration in Battir and its neighbouring villages by applying military orders, and 
then declared “state land” by exploiting Ottoman law, which still represents, together 
with the Jordanian law,  part of the basic framework of colonial law in the OPT37. While 
at the end of the Seventies the purpose of dispossession through military orders was, 
officially speaking, to create ‘temporary’ military structures (the outposts, as in the case 
of Kfar Etzion) rather than civil ones, during the Eighties this legal philosophy was 
flanked by new methods of state expropriation reinforcing the expansion of the Israeli 
state sovereignty over the area.  After the “state lands” came those expropriated for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 This is how the Israeli journalist Gorenberg (2007: 116-118) described this historical moment in which the 
“temporary border” constituted Green Line has been obliterated and the Israeli colonization of the West Bank 
has been triggered in our area of study by state and non-state actors: “None of the actual characteristics of an 
outpost existed; the settlers were not soldiers and therefore were not serving in Nahal, a branch of the army; 
there were no officers, no uniforms, no military tasks such as conducting patrols of the area. Nonetheless, next 
morning’s  papers all dutifully reported the establishment of a Nahal security post. […] The myth of a reluctant 
Eshkol pushed by Orthodox settlers into reestablishing Kfar Etzion would later serve the purposes both of the 
Israeli left and the young Orthodox rebels. But […] Eshkol made a choice, knowingly evaded legal constraints, 
imposed his decision on the cabinet, and misrepresented his intentions abroad”. 
36 Rosh Zurim (1969), Alon Sherut (1970), Har Gilo (1972), Tekoa and Migdal Oz (1977), Efrat (1980), Ma’ale 
Amos (1981), Neve Daniel and Nokdim (1982), Adora and Asfar (1983), Karme Tzur and Kedar (1984), Beitar 
Illit (1985), Bat Ayin (1989): over 2000 hectares of “municipal areas” (not counting the conspicuous amount of 
land expropriated and turned into various types of infrastructure for the settlers). As is evident from the 
chronology, most of these colonies were established before the Oslo Accords, but almost all experienced 
booming territorial expansion and infrastructures above all after the agreement. Source: Foundation for Middle 
East Peace: http://asp.fmep.org/app/settlement/ShowSettlementTablePage.aspx.  
37 Most of the expropriation took place in the lands that Ottoman law after 1858 defined as miri: these made up 
a 2.5 km ring around the Palestinian villages, and consisted of farmed land which alternated with uncultivated 
land. The ring formed a sort of hinge-like space between the various villages. The legal status of these areas was 
of lands owned by the State, which allowed Palestinian farmers right of use. A Turkish law of 1913 abolished 
any distinction between use and ownership, allowing the farmers who had registered their land full right of 
ownership. In 1967, only 30% of the lands were in the Land Registry, and much of the expropriation, later 
declared as “State lands”, was concentrated in the remaining 70% (Bimkom 2008). On the incorporation 
through military orders of the Ottoman and Jordanian laws into the “infrastructures of control” of the West 
Bank after 1967, see Gordon (2008: 26-27) 
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“public use”, and together with the “public lands” were those expropriated for “security 
reasons”, the expedient which was progressively more frequently implemented after the 
Oslo agreement, especially after the Second Intifada. 
 
 This complex jurisdictional machine provided the state, the settlers and the 
military and civilian architects of the occupation in the area with a fundamental backbone 
for both further enclavisation of the Palestinian villages and exclavisation of the 
settlements. The “natural growth” of the colonies and their civilian infrastructures was 
made on this very articulated set of expropriated lands. So, the area was subjected, bit by 
bit, to further fragmentation: new infrastructures; new roads for “Jews only” – encircling 
the Palestinian enclaves and preventing their urban expansion and their possibility of 
planning –; a new system of tunnels “sterilizing” settlers’ roads and separating the settlers 
and the Palestinian inhabitants of the villages through apparent measures of “traffic 
management” (See Fig. 2). This process can be defined as “shifting legal geography” 
(Weizman 2006: 91): a process of continuous refinement of a departmentalized space; a 
process of “masked apartheid” in which the expansion of the landscape of Israeli 
citizenship and the restriction of the Palestinian space of life were enabled both by the 
violence of the Army and the legal procedures of the Israeli Supreme Court. 
 
 It is within this framework of military and civilian measures that the present post-
Oslo jurisdictional and territorial order of our space of enquiry was finally shaped (See 
Fig. 3). The Oslo  
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Accords (1995) further fragmented the territory of Battir and its surrounding villages into 
“B-C Areas”38, enclavising the urban centers into the so called “Area B” (according to a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 “Areas A include major Palestinian centres in the OPT. Areas B consists of other Palestinian-populated 
regions of the OPT, including a number of small towns, villages and hamlets. Area C covers all remaining 
territory of the West Bank [and] area C is the only one that is [territorially] contiguous. Areas A and B form 
island of Palestinian jurisdiction […]. In Areas A, the PA has full authority over civil affairs, and internal 
security and public order, while Israel retains responsibility over external security. In Areas B, the PA exercises 
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demographic principle), and providing the Israeli Civil Administration and the Army with 
“temporary” administrative, planning and “security” powers over those very areas (C) on 
which confiscations and expropriations took place after 1967. Area C surrounding Battir 
and its closest villages has been the theatre of a constant proliferation of security 
infrastructures (fences, roadblocks, the Wall of separation), civilian infrastructures of 
connection of the settlements and disconnection of the territorial continuity between 
Palestinian inhabited areas (settler’s roads, junctions, tunnels). 
 
 It is the game with this line – between B and C – that is becoming more and more 
the legal battlefield on which Israeli state and non-state actors, Israeli Supreme Court, 
Palestinian Authority, lawyers and human rights organisations are fighting to extend or 
combat the elastic colonial sovereignty of Israel.    
 
The “Red Castle” and Democratic Colonialism 
 What is particularly interesting in the contemporary framework of the colonisation 
of the Palestinian Territories is what we could name the democratic forms that Israeli 
colonialism is assuming. The following legal case study – a case that has recently been 
brought in front of the Israeli Supreme court and that I had the opportunity of 
reconstructing during my research on the relationship between space and law in the 
village of Battir – and its genesis – so in the very etimological sense of the word, 
intended as the process of generation of a legal trial in the Israeli Supreme Court39 – 
provide us with a clear example of what Michel Foucault described as judiciability 
(Foucault 1977) in a colonial context. Generally speaking, judiciability is the “sphere of 
what can enter the field of pertinence of a judicial action”; what is interesting in a 
contemporary colonial frontier as the one separating Area B and Area C in the village of 
Battir are the very “bottom-up” dynamics producing the effect of “magnetizing” the 
Palestinian non-citizens in the sphere of judicial action of a colonial instance such as the 
Israeli Supreme Court. What this legal case will show is that in an “ordered chaos” such 
as the one governing the Occupied Palestinian Territories, violent colonial actors – such 
as the settlers – can act as a NGO, claiming a monitoring function vis à vis what they 
perceive – in a specific historical circumstance, as we will see – as a non-democratic state 
(Israel), and proclaiming a “struggle for equality” which perfectly adapt to the political 
ecosystem generated by the model of colonial occupation promoted by that very state 
they are contesting. What in the classic conception of the political contemporaneity have 
been conceived as key actors – NGOs, human rights association, the so called civil 
society – in the creation of a balance for the excesses of the states, are becoming – in the 
specific form they assume within the Israeli ecosystem of the occupation – an important 
instance of reproduction and sophistication of the Israeli colonial sovereignty, beyond 
their apparent clash with the state. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
civil authority and maintains a police force to protect “public order for Palestinians”, while Israel retains 
“overriding responsibility for the purpose of protecting Israelis and confronting the threat of terrorism” […]. In 
Areas C Israel retain complete territorial jurisdiction.” (Source, Palestine Liberation Organisation Negotiations 
Affairs Department, Briefing Note). 61% of the West Bank is Area C, 21% is Area B and 18% A. In the area of 
Battir more than 90% of the territory is area C, and there is no Area A, but only B and C. The A-B-C order 
should have last for five “temporary” years but a final Israeli withdrawal never took place.   
39 The Israeli Supreme Court is the highest judicial entity in Israel. As supreme organism of judgment of the 
state, it has somehow followed the path of extension of the Israeli colonial sovereignty, expanding its judicial 
activities to the Occupied Palestinian Territories.   
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 The legal case study I intend to analyse is that of what the inhabitants of Battir, the 
Civil Administration and the associations of Israeli settlers by now call the “red castle”. 
This case might be defined as liminal, on the border between what the Oslo agreement 
marked off as Areas “B” and “C”, between the urban area of the village and the areas 
particularly hit by the historical Israeli policies of confiscation and house demolition. 
 
 As you enter Battir’s main street, both sides of the main artery through the village 
are still in Area B. A few tens of metres along on the right hand side of the road, 
delimited by an invisible line, starts what Rabin’s Israeli government and the nascent 
National Palestinian Authority recognized at Oslo as Area C (see Fig. 4). One of the most 
recent constructions, built at the beginning of the main road to the historical centre is the 
so-called “red castle” (Qasr Aḥmar), a luxury residence which takes its name from the 
nickname of its owner –a  Palestinian from the Diaspora who emigrated to the United 
States, where he opened a supermarket chain– and from the colour of the stone the 
architects had initially chosen before the construction work began. What is of interest is 
not so much the luxury of the castle although, as we shall see it has become part of the  
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legal battle, but rather the jurisdictional and spatial context in which the castle has been 
built, and the dynamics its construction has set off. 
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 In December 2009, two years after the foundations of the building were laid, some 
very unusual members of a human rights association turned up, accompanied by a 
reporter from Israel’s Channel 10 and a television crew. They interviewed the contractor 
(wakῑl) of the villa40 and began asking him details about the owner and legal statute of the 
building as regards the B-C territorial order: information that the contractor provided in 
good faith. In actual fact, these supposedly casual passers-by were representatives of a 
peculiar human rights association: the “Regavim Movement for the Protection of 
National Land”, which defines itself, in the words of one of its exponents, as a “non-
political movement whose aim is to protect national lands and properties, preventing 
others [my italics] from illegally taking possession of national property resources”41. As a 
Regavim spokesperson declared at the Israeli newspaper Ha’aretz during an interview 
with Israeli journalist Amira Hass, the organization: 
 
[Regavim] is taking a very serious approach toward the illegal 
takeover by Arabs of lands in Area C in Judea and Samaria [the 
biblical name for the Palestinian West Bank], including by means of 
agricultural cultivation designed only for this purpose. Regavim is 
following with concern the increasing involvement violating the laws of 
the State of Israel and brazenly undermining its sovereignty ... Regavim 
calls on the of foreign countries and entities in establishing facts on the 
ground unilaterally [my emphasis], while Foreign Ministry to convey 
an unequivocal message to the international parties [active in 
Palestine-Israel], and state that Israel is very upset by their behavior 
and demands that they immediately desist. The Regavim movement is 
pleased to hear that the Civil Administration has responded to its 
demands and has been enforcing the law in an egalitarian manner, 
among Arabs as well.42  
 
 Previously only active on the Israeli side of the Green Line, the original aim of this 
‘national association’ was to report ‘illegal Arab building’ by Palestinians who were still 
living in Israel after 1948. It is now becoming increasingly active, however, in the OPT, 
given that its ‘hard core’ is made up of right-wing settler-observers of whom there is a 
high concentration in the southern colonies of the West Bank, between Hebron, 
Bethlehem and Jericho43. In one of their petitions, the members of this association define 
themselves as a NGO that pays close attention to the relationship between space and law 
and which is invested with a vein of “indigenism” that aims to protect the public from 
any exploitation it might be subjected to by its own State, almost as if in a sort of 
democratic emergency:  
 
[Regavim is] an association responsible for the protection of the 
citizens of Judea and Samaria, for the prevention of the use of the land 
by those who are unauthorized to do it, and for the surveillance of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 The contractor is handling construction work on the villa and the legal question that has arisen after the visit 
from the ‘human rights association’. 
41 Jerusalem Post, 03-09-2010: http://www.jpost.com/Israel/Article.aspx?id=153805. 
42 Declaration by a Regavim spokesperson, cit. in Hass (2010a). 
43 On the monitoring and petitions by Regavim against the Bedouins living in Jericho, in area C, and on the 
organization’s campaign against “migrating nomads who are placing at risk the resources in an area due to 
experience natural growth [of the settlers]”, see Hass (2010b). 
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activities of the [Israeli] authorities with the aim of making them 
respect the law [my emphasis].   
 
 Regavim’s monitoring activities, which appear to range widely, are turning into a 
series of reports that the association is sending to top members of the Israeli government, 
to the colonial administration of the West Bank and the Israeli Supreme Court. Let us 
attempt to see what they are materially producing. After a petition presented by the 
organization to the Supreme Court in September 2009, for the first time in the history of 
the state of Israel the Court decided to carry out a number of orders to demolish 
Palestinian houses in the West Bank, further extending its jurisdiction within the OPT. In 
the past, these orders had been the prerogative of the Israeli Civil Administration, the 
Israeli colonial administration in the OPT. At the beginning of November 2009, the legal 
head of Regavim implemented the Right to Information Act, asking the District Court of 
Jerusalem for a list of international organizations operating in the West Bank and to see 
the applications presented to the Civil Administration by these organizations in order to 
construct  humanitarian infrastructures and buildings. The group declared: 
 
The citizens of the State of Israel have the right to know what the 
foreign organizations [by that meaning foreign organizations working 
with the Palestinians] are doing in Israel [my emphasis], how the IDF 
and Civilian Administration treat them, and whether funds from foreign 
countries are used in illegal.44 
 
 At the end of November 2009, the Defence Minister Ehud Barak sent 40 new 
‘building inspectors’ to the West Bank to reinforce the “settlement freeze” announced by 
the mixed Likud-Labour government of Benjamin Netanyahu. At the same time, 
Regavim submitted a petition to the Ministry of Defence against construction of Battir’s 
“red castle”, requesting its demolition. The timing of the petition, presented at the same 
time as the start of the so-called “settlement freeze”, is particularly important in helping 
us understand the nature of Regavim’s legal claims to the areas in the West Bank, as well 
as the strategy of equality the association adopted in its radical democratic colonialism. 
Regavim is in fact fighting for most peculiar forms of “equality” and “non-
discrimination” in Battir and other zones: the right for equal treatment from the colonial 
authorities of the Civil Administration as regards the “illegal constructions” of the settlers 
and of those of the Palestinian inhabitants of the OPT. By exploiting the Israeli 
government’s decision to officially freeze the settlement construction, due to 
international and US pressure to reopen peace negotiations for the umpteenth time, 
Regavim is in actual fact working on a further –detailed– extension of Israel’s colonial 
sovereignty in the OPT, especially in Area C, by trying to reproduce a system of 
restrictions, immobilize construction work and protect national lands in a manner similar 
to that which the Palestinians of Israel or Jerusalem are subjected to. 
 
 Due both to its ‘unrestricted’ range of action in the territory –with an approach 
very similar to Golda Meir’s definition of a frontier–, and to its articulated network –a 
structure empowered by international ideological and financial support–, it is hard to 
accept Regavim’s self-definition as simply a “national right association”. Like Saskia 
Sassen (2006), we could define it as a “trans-national assemblage”, a small-scale 
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“ethnically pure” political organization with branches worldwide, which profits from the 
support of lobby groups which include major exponents of the Canadian Jewish 
community. The Jewish Tribune, Canada’s main Jewish newspaper, defines Regavim and 
its role within another national and global assemblage, the Legal Forum for the Land of 
Israel: 
 
The Regavim Movement for the Protection of National Land is one of 
those organizations [that takes part in the Legal Forum]. While 
unauthorized Jewish-built outposts [the military term used to hide the 
start of a new settlement in the West Bank] in Judea and Samaria are 
often demolished by the government, similar violations by Palestinians 
are generally ignored. In response, Regavim’s members take pictures 
and document the construction and pursue these cases with the 
authorities – even to the courts.45 
 
 Registered in Israel, Regavim is backed internationally by a global network of 
funding and power and has recently shifted its activities from the ‘homeland’ to the 
colonial frontiers of Israel. Its activities can be followed the world over on the Internet – 
as our own reconstruction shows– and nationally on Israeli television.  
 
 Let us however try to examine the legal debate that Regavim, this democratic 
figure which is supplementing the eco system of the colonial practices and spatial 
dynamics, has attempted to fuel with its petition to the Supreme Court against the castle 
of Battir. This will help understand the language with which the organization is trying to 
take a leading role in the legal arena of colonial sovereignty, and the nature of this role. 
The petition is addressed to the Court and it attacks four entities: the Minister of Defence 
Barak, the head of the “Civil Administration of Judea and Samaria”, the military head of 
the Civil Administration and the “red castle’s” representative. Claiming that the castle is 
entirely situated in Area C and that no permission of any kind has been afforded by the 
Civil Administration as required by the Oslo agreement, the petition asks for construction 
of the villa to be stopped and, and its electric and sewage to be demolished. Alongside the 
argument that the Oslo agreement is being violated, the petition uses an even more 
explicit language regarding the organization’s spatial policies. Indeed the Israeli colonial 
administration is criticized for: its negligence over what Regavim calls “transformation of 
the features of the area” –claiming that the villa alters the geography of the biblical 
landscape of the zone–; the fact that the castle stands in a “dominant position” –that the 
hills of Jerusalem can be seen from the area and even better from the castle– and that, 
since it is “close to the Wall”, there might be “repercussions on the security of the 
settlers” in transit; the luxuriousness of the villa, underlining more than once how 
inexplicable it is for a Palestinian from the Diaspora to be able to build a 5 million dollar 
villa.  
 
 To this game between legal discourse and matters outside the colonial law as it has 
been drawn in Oslo (i.e. the cost of the villa), and to this attempt by Regavim to berate 
the administration for not performing an increasingly detailed monitoring of the 
agricultural and building practices of the Palestinians living in Area C –a game which 
aims more at extending the borders of colonial sovereignty and surveillance than any real, 
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and extremely unlikely, equal treatment of the illegal Palestinian constructions and those 
of any settlers–, both Ehud Barak and the Civil Administration have replied by 
attempting to re-establish the legal order which came out of the Oslo agreement. Both the 
Minister of Defence and the administration have confirmed their authority, challenged by 
Regavim, and the legitimacy of their work, claiming that the government is aware of all 
the “illegal constructions and farming activities without permits” in the pre-Oslo area: 
constructions “without permits” and farming activities, such as the building of wells, 
concerning which the administration had opened files before the Oslo agreements but 
that, answering Regavim, they claim not to be able to implement in the demolition orders 
since these would represent a kind of retroactive malfunctioning or disorder of the 
current post-Oslo  pacification order. The clash here is between a rightist settlers 
movement that adopted an anti-state and rights discourse, and a government that in the 
particular ecosystem of this legal case is assuming a presumed moderate position, re-
establishing the authoritativeness of that very accord which enabled the continuation and 
the refinement of the apparatus of occupation. 
 
 However, the “red castle” legal case is still in a procedural phase at the Supreme 
Court. Indeed, as far as one can see from maps, a large part of the castle stands in Area B, 
while a small portion of the building and the plots of land bought by the owner prior to 
construction are in Area C (see Fig. 5). Multifarious maps show the line 
compartmentalizing the space to be volatile, and most of those available do not show 
with any clarity the threshold between these two different jurisdictional territories, with 
their separate legal systems. Rather than from the “dominant position” described by the 
lawyers of Regavim, the choice of the owner – backed by the National Palestinian 
Authority, which asserted its administrative and planning authority by approving the 
villa’s construction – seems to have been dictated by a ploy that took advantage of the 
jurisdictional and territorial line mapped out by Oslo, or rather by playing with the 
inherent elasticity of that line in the attempt to appropriate a liminal space, that threshold 
which embodies the territorial order of sovereignty, but also a space which engenders 
practices that can undermine and subvert that very order. To paraphrase Golda Meir, the 
frontier is where the Palestinians live. 




 Since 1967 Israel’s illegal extension of its sovereignty has progressively 
intersected with International Humanitarian Law. Human rights organisation defending 
the rights of the Palestinian have always occupied the ambiguous threshold between the 
sphere of the protection of a population under occupation and that of the enablement of 
the occupation through the assumption of those very duties which, according to the 
International Humanitarian Law, are up to the occupying power. After the recent wars on 
the Palestinians (the Second Intifada and the wars on Gaza), the recent increase of Israeli 
repression towards its citizens of Palestinian origin, and after the recent attack on the 
humanitarian ship Mavi Marmara, it seems that international human rights organisations 
have become Israel’s “strategic threat”, together with Iran, Hamas and Hezbollah 
(Weizman, Keenan 2010). The attack to the Gaza Flotilla is the first deliberate attack on a 
humanitarian convoy. Are these dynamics and the proliferation of rights associations, 
even among violent settlers, two sides of the same coin? Are peculiar human rights 
associations such as Regavim trying to monopolize the right discourse, normalize the 
occupation and produce their specific conception of rights for a specific category of 
citizens, the same way the State of Israel is attacking humanitarian NGOs in order to 
obliterate the violence of its siege on Gaza? If, on one hand, post-colonial states can 
become democratic forms of colonialism (Chatterjee 2007), on the other hand, can Israeli 





      89 
Bibliography  
 
Bimkom, Planners for Planning Rights, (2008), The Prohibited Zone: Israeli Planning 
Policy in the Palestinian Villages in Area C, Report, May. 
 
Chatterjee P. (2007), “Democratic Colonialism”, Mainstream Weekly, 
http://www.mainstreamweekly.net/article120.html 
 
Efrat Z. (2003), “The Plan”, in Segal R., Weizman E. (eds.), pp. 59-78. 
 
FMEP, Foundation for Middle East Peace, (2009), Report on Israeli Settlement in the 
Occupied Territories, Vol. 15, n. 6, September-October.   
 
Foucault M. (1977), “La redéfinition du 'judiciable'”, Justice, n°115, juin, pp. 36-39. 
 
Foucault M. (2003), Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the Collège de France, 
1975–76, Penguin Books, London. 
 
Gorenberg G. (2007), Occupied Territories: the Untold Story of Israel’s Settlements, 
Tauris, New York.  
 
Gordon N. (2008), Israel’s Occupation, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los 
Angeles, California. 
 
Hass A. (2009), “What does Israel have against a Palestinian stadium?”, Ha’aretz, 26 
November 2009, available online: 
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1129433.html. 
 
Hass A. (2010a), “Palestinian farmers are being treated like criminals”, Ha’aretz, 28 
January, available online: http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1144286.html. 
Hass A. (2010b), “Bedouins fight state for land near Dead Sea”, Ha’aretz, 18 March, 
available online: http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1155866.html. 




Kelly T. (2006), Law, Violence and Sovereignty Among West Bank Palestinians, 
Cambridge Studies in Law and Society, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge. 
 
Kimmerling B. (1982), “Change and Continuity in Zionist Territorial Orientations and 
Politics”, Comparative Politics, Vol.14, n.2.  
 
Misselwitz P., Rieniets T. (eds. 2006), City of Collision. Jerusalem and the Principles of 
Conflict Urbanism, Birkhauser, Basel. 
 
Sassen S. (2006), Territory, Authority Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages, 
Princeton University Press. 
 
90      Journal of Law & Social Research (JLSR) Vol.1, No. 1 
Segal R., Weizman E. (eds. 2003), A Civilian Occupation. The Politics of Israeli 
Architecture, Babel-Verso, Israel-London. 
 
Weizman E. (2006), “Principles of frontier geography”, in Misselwitz P., Rieniets T. 
(eds), pp. 83-91. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
